### 1NC—Unipolarity Bad

#### No regional rebalancing or security dilemmas—the only empirical data goes our way.

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The final and in some ways most important pathological belief generated by hubris places the United States at the center of the current era of relative peace. “All that stands between civility and genocide, order and mayhem,” explain Kaplan and Kristol, “is American power.”68 This belief is a variant of what is known as the “hegemonic stability theory,” which proposes that international peace is only possible when there is one country strong enough to make and enforce a set of rules.69 Although it was first developed to describe economic behavior, the theory has been applied more broadly, to explain the current proliferation of peace. At the height of Pax Romana between roughly 27 BC and 180 AD, for example, Rome was able to bring an unprecedented level of peace and security to the Mediterranean. The Pax Britannica of the nineteenth century brought a level of stability to the high seas. Perhaps the current era is peaceful because the United States has established a de facto Pax Americana in which no power is strong enough to challenge its dominance, and because it has established a set of rules that are generally in the interests of all countries to follow. Without a benevolent hegemon, some strategists fear, instability may break out around the globe.70 Unchecked conflicts could bring humanitarian disaster and, in today’s interconnected world, economic turmoil that could ripple throughout global financial markets. There are good theoretical and empirical reasons, however, to doubt that U.S hegemony is the primary cause of the current stability.

First, the hegemonic-stability argument shows the classic symptom of hubris: It overestimates the capability of the United States, in this case to maintain global stability. No state, no matter how strong, can impose peace on determined belligerents. The U.S. military may be the most imposing in the history of the world, but it can only police the system if the other members generally cooperate. Self-policing must occur, in other words; if other states had not decided on their own that their interests are best served by peace, then no amount of international constabulary work by the United States could keep them from fighting. The five percent of the world’s population that lives in the United States simply cannot force peace upon an unwilling ninety-five percent. Stability and unipolarity may be simply coincidental.

In order for U.S. hegemony to be the explanation for global stability, the rest of the world would have to expect reward for good behavior and fear punishment for bad. Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has not been especially eager to enforce any particular rules. Even rather incontrovertible evidence of genocide has not been enough to inspire action. Hegemonic stability can only take credit for influencing those decisions that would have ended in war without the presence, whether physical or psychological, of the United States. Since most of the world today is free to fight without U.S. involvement, something else must be preventing them from doing so.71 Stability exists in many places where no hegemony is present. Ethiopia and Eritrea are hardly the only states that could go to war without the slightest threat of U.S. intervention, yet few choose to do so.

Second, it is worthwhile to repeat one of the most basic observations about misperception in international politics, one that is magnified by hubris: Rarely are our actions as consequential upon their behavior as we believe them to be. The ego-centric bias suggests that while it may be natural for U.S. policymakers to interpret their role as crucial in the maintenance of world peace, they are almost certainly overestimating their own importance. At the very least, the United States is probably not as central to the myriad decisions in foreign capitals that help maintain international stability as it thinks it is.

Third, if U.S. security guarantees were the primary cause of the restraint shown by the other great and potentially great powers, then those countries would be demonstrating an amount of trust in the intentions, judgment and wisdom of another that would be without precedent in international history. If the states of Europe and the Pacific Rim detected a good deal of danger in the system, relying entirely on the generosity and sagacity (or, perhaps the naiveté and gullibility) of Washington would be the height of strategic irresponsibility. Indeed it is hard to think of a similar choice: When have any capable members of an alliance virtually disarmed and allowed another member to protect their interests? It seems more logical to suggest that the other members of NATO and Japan just do not share the same perception of threat that the United States does. If there was danger out there, as so many in the U.S. national security community insist, then the grand strategies of the allies would be quite different. Even during the Cold War, U.S. allies were not always convinced that they could rely on U.S. security commitments. Extended deterrence was never entirely comforting; few Europeans could be sure that United States would indeed sacrifice New York for Hamburg. In the absence of the unifying Soviet threat, their trust in U.S. commitments for their defense would presumably be lower—if in fact that commitment was at all necessary outside of the most pessimistic works of fiction.

Furthermore, in order for hegemonic stability logic to be an adequate explanation for restrained behavior, allied states must not only be fully convinced of the intentions and capability of the hegemon to protect their interests; they must also trust that the hegemon can interpret those interests correctly and consistently. As discussed above, the allies do not feel that the United States consistently demonstrates the highest level of strategic wisdom. In fact, they often seem to look with confused eyes upon our behavior, and are unable to explain why we so often find it necessary to go abroad in search of monsters to destroy. They will participate at times in our adventures, but minimally and reluctantly.

Finally, while believers in hegemonic stability as the primary explanation for the long peace have articulated a logic that some find compelling, they are rarely able to cite much evidence to support their claims. In fact, the limited empirical data we have suggests that there is little connection between the relative level of U.S. activism and international stability. During the 1990s, the United States cut back on defense fairly substantially, spending $100 billion less in real terms in 1998 that it did in 1990, which was a twenty-five percent reduction.72 To defense hawks and other believers in hegemonic stability, this irresponsible “peace dividend” endangered both national and global security. “No serious analyst of American military capabilities doubts that the defense budget has been cut much too far to meet America’s responsibilities to itself and to world peace,” argued Kristol and Kagan.”73 If global stability were unrelated to U.S. hegemony, however, one would not have expected an increase in conflict and violence.

The verdict from the last two decades is fairly plain: The world grew more peaceful while the United States cut its forces.74 No state believed that its security was endangered by a less-capable U.S. military, or at least none took any action that would suggest such a belief. No defense establishments were enhanced to address power vacuums; no security dilemmas drove insecurity or arms races; no regional balancing occurred after the stabilizing presence of the U.S. military was diminished. The rest of the world acted as if the threat of international war was not a pressing concern, despite the reduction in U.S. capabilities. The incidence and magnitude of global conflict declined while the United States cut its military spending under President Clinton, and kept declining as the Bush Administration ramped that spending back up. The two phenomena are unrelated.

These figures will not be enough to convince skeptics. Military spending figures by themselves are insufficient to disprove a connection between overall U.S. actions and international stability, and one could also presumably argue that spending is not the only or even the best indication of hegemony, that it is instead U.S. foreign political and security commitments that maintain stability. Since neither was significantly altered during this period, instability should not be expected. Alternately, advocates of hegemonic stability could believe that relative rather than absolute spending is decisive in bringing peace. Although the United States cut back on its spending during the 1990s, its relative advantage never wavered.

However, two points deserve to be made. First, even if it were true that either U.S. commitments or relative spending account for global pacific trends, it would remain the case that stability can be maintained at drastically lower levels. In other words, even if one can be allowed to argue in the alternative for a moment and suppose that there is in fact a level of engagement below which the United States cannot drop without increasing international disorder, a rational grand strategist would still cut back on engagement and spending until that level is determined. Basic logic suggests that the United States ought to spend the minimum amount of its blood and treasure while seeking the maximum return on its investment. And if, as many suspect, this era of global peace proves to be inherently stable because normative evolution is typically unidirectional, then no increase in conflict would ever occur, irrespective of U.S. spending.75 Abandoning the mission to stabilize the world would save untold trillions for an increasingly debt-ridden nation.

Second, it is also worth noting that if opposite trends had unfolded, if other states had reacted to news of cuts in U.S. defense spending with more aggressive or insecure behavior, then surely hegemonists would note that their expectations had been justified. If increases in conflict would have been interpreted as evidence for the wisdom of internationalist strategies, then logical consistency demands that the lack thereof should at least pose a problem. As it stands, the only evidence we have regarding the relationship between U.S. power and international stability suggests that the two are unrelated. Evidently the rest of the world can operate quite effectively without the presence of a global policeman. Those who think otherwise base their view on faith alone.

It requires a good deal of hubris for any actor to consider itself indispensable to world peace. Far from collapsing into a whirlwind of chaos, the chances are high that the world would look much like it does now if the United States were to cease regarding itself as God’s gladiator on earth. The people of the United States would be a lot better off as well.

#### Great power wars are unthinkable—unipolarity just results in minor power wars.

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FORCE TODAY - Two dramatic and seemingly-contradictory trends are central. On the one hand, since the end of the Cold War if not before, the amount of inter-state and even civil war has drastically declined. Of course much depends on the time periods selected and the counting rules employed, but by any measure international wars are scarce if not vanishing, and civil wars, after blossoming in the 1990s, have greatly diminished.32 Significant instances of civil strife remain and are made salient by the horrific examples that appear in the newspapers every day, but in fact all inventories that I know of conclude that they are fewer than they used to be. Ironically, although realism stresses the conflict–inducing power of international anarchy, the barriers and inhibitions against international war now seem significantly more robust than those limiting civil wars. But even the latter are stronger than they were in the past. Although a central question is whether these trends will be reversed, they truly are startling, of great importance, and were largely unpredicted. They also remain insufficiently appreciated; one rarely reads statements about how fortunate we are to live in such a peaceful era. Perhaps the reasons are that optimism is generally derided in the cynical academic community, peace is not the sort of dramatic event that seizes public (and media) attention, and in the absence of major wars, we all find other things to worry about.

But Plato was not entirely wrong to say that “only the dead have seen the end of war.”33 Force, even when deeply recessed, can come to the surface again. Discussions in the US and Europe about relations with Iran often debate whether force should be “taken off the table.” But, regardless of whether it would be desirable to do so, would this be possible? As long as important disputes with Iran remain, with even the best will in the world there are limits to how far thoughts of the use of force could be pushed out of the minds of all the participants, especially those in Tehran. It is interesting that Tony Blair told the Chilcot commission that with respect to Iraq “even prior to September 11, 2001…. You know, the fact is [that] force was always an option.”34

Don’t try to tell Bashar al-Assad or Muammar Qaddafi that force is no longer important. As Osgood and Tucker noted in their important study over 40 years ago, “if force has lost its utility, its condemnation on moral grounds is superfluous.”35 Libya, in fact, represents the other trend. Since the end of the Cold War, the US, and to a lesser but significant extent Britain and France, have used force more often than they did before. Panama, the Gulf War, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq, and now Libya are unmatched in the Cold War era. The US is now fighting three wars, although by the time this article appears in print its military role in Libya and Iraq may be over. Of course these military adventures are all small by comparison with most wars, and certainly by the standards of Korea and Vietnam, let alone the wars between Iran and Iraq and Ethiopia and Eritrea. Nevertheless, they cannot be dismissed.

It is beyond my scope to explore all the possible explanations for either of these trends, but it does seem clear that the rise in American military activity was caused at least in part by the end of the Cold War and the related fact that the US is now the sole superpower. The new configuration means that the US is no longer deterred from entering local conflicts by the fear of a confrontation with the Soviet Union, makes others rely even more on the US to be a policeman (if often a misguided one), and elevates the salience of both threats and values that were previously trumped by the superpower rivalry. Opportunities loom larger for the US and the UK than they did during the Cold War, and new threats calling for military intervention have increased in visibility if not in actual occurrence. To start with the latter, although terrorism was a concern during the Cold War, it played nothing like the role that it does now. Of course the US never suffered an attack like 9/11 before, but while I will briefly discuss the extent of the danger of terrorism later, here I want to argue that the common placement of terrorism at the top of the list of threats is a product not only of the attacks over the past decade, but also of the paucity of other threats. The felt need to use force against terrorists, states that support them and even countries that might work with them in the future in part stems from a security environment that is remarkably benign.

THE SECURITY COMMUNITY - Alongside and in part responsible for the two contrasting trends in the use of force is the existence of a security community among the world’s leading powers. Although I can be brief because I have discussed this elsewhere,40 the point is of fundamental importance. For the first time in history, the leading states of the world (the US, most of Europe, and Japan) not only are at peace with each other, but find the idea of war within this group literally unthinkable (which is the definition of a security community).41 Although Russia and China remain outside the community (which is not to say that war with or between them is highly likely, but only that it is within the realm of possibility), the change in world politics is enormous. War among the leading powers of the world and, at least as much, fear of war, preparation for war, and the desire to avoid such wars if possible--and prevail in them if not--has been the driving motor of international politics for centuries. At the risk of hyperbole, I think we can say that turning off this motor is the greatest change in international politics that we have ever seen. Its implications remain hard to grasp, and indeed how citizens and leaders come to understand this new world will strongly shape how they behave. But even now it is clear that the existence of the security community is crucial to world politics, international relations theory, and our lives.

Obvious questions are what caused the community to form, what could lead it to be replicated elsewhere, and what if anything could lead it to unravel. I have discussed the first question in my earlier writings and so will discuss only the latter two topics here. Of course speculations about what could bring the community to an end are not unrelated to analysis of its causes despite the fact that path-dependence could be at work and the possibility that the community could survive an end to the factors that brought it into being. Nevertheless, just as the community was formed by changes in domestic regimes, ruling values and ideas, and the costs and benefits of war and peace, so factors in these categories might bring us back to earlier and less fortunate relations. On top of all the normal unknowns in dealing with possible futures, our speculations are limited by the fact that the security community is particularly psychological in that it is defined by the unthinkability of war among the members. If we know little about how events move from being seen as possible to actually coming about, we know even less about what forces and processes move them from being unthinkable to being seen as possible.42

Here it is worth stressing that the fact that war among the members is unthinkable has real consequences beyond the fact that peace is maintained. When I ask my undergraduates whether they think they will live to see a war with another leading power, they look at me as though I have lost my mind because such an idea has never crossed theirs. What—among other things—they fail to realize is that their state of mind is without precedent and that the ability to go about their lives without the slightest concern that they or their country might—just might—have to fight another leading power shapes a good deal of their lives and our society. This is not to say that their lives are now free from worry, but only that their freedom from worrying about what used to be considered the greatest scourge of the human race gives them freedom to worry about other things.

On a larger scale, societies and governments within the community can go about their business without thinking about how this might affect the prospects for peace or the outcome of war with other members. Like my students’ lack of concern, we take this for granted, but in fact it represents a sharp break from the past. Rivalries, concern for relative position, and the desire for bargaining advantages still remain, but the intensity and consequences are quite different when war is out of the question. The whole tenor of inter-state relations and fundamental attitudes toward conflict and cooperation are different from the time a century ago when a British observer could return from a trip to Germany saying “Every one of those new factory chimneys is a gun pointed at England.”43

I see no reason to expect the community to come to an end. Indeed, the fact that it is defined by the participants’ beliefs that war cannot occur means that if they thought it would end, then in fact it would be dissolved (although war might not actually occur). More broadly, just as I noted earlier that expectations of war can be self-fulfilling, so can expectations of peace. But since academic musings have little impact, it is safe to pursue our scholarly duty of asking about what developments, currently unforeseen, might destroy the community.

Just as one pillar of the community was the transformation of the old idea that war was honorable and glorious by the almost universal repugnance of it44 (and this is one reason why any war now has to be carefully sold to the public), the community would be at least weakened if this attitude changed. Is it conceivable that war could come back into fashion? It is literally unimaginable that slavery or monarchical rule could return to favor. The current replacements for these ideas are deeply woven into the fabric of the social order, and the current conception of war as a terrible enterprise similarly does not stand alone and presumably could not change without wide-ranging alteration of our societies. One dreadful but I think unlikely possibility would be that the success of a series of military interventions of the type we have seen recently could lead to a general reevaluation of not only the utility of this kind of force, but of its fundamental role in human endeavors. Even without this, might values change in a cyclical fashion? Might boredom lead to a resurrection of the idea that force is noble? Could males, finding themselves losing power and status in their societies, seek a return to a world in which the arena of violence in which they have a comparative advantage is seen more positively? If it impossible to say that this cannot occur, it seems at least as difficult to foresee a chain of events that would bring this about. (But it is worth noting that before September 11, 2001 few of us believed that torture might come back into the inventory of state behavior.) Even if war is still seen as evil, the security community could be dissolved if severe conflicts of interest were to arise. Could the more peaceful world generate new interests that would bring the members of the community into sharp disputes?45 A zero-sum sense of status would be one example, perhaps linked to a steep rise in nationalism. More likely would be a worsening of the current economic difficulties, which could itself produce greater nationalism, undermine democracy, and bring back old-fashioned beggar-thy-neighbor economic policies. While these dangers are real, it is hard to believe that the conflicts could be great enough to lead the members of the community to contemplate fighting each other. It is not so much that economic interdependence has proceeded to the point where it could not be reversed—states that were more internally interdependent than anything seen internationally have fought bloody civil wars. Rather it is that even if the more extreme versions of free trade and economic liberalism become discredited, it is hard to see how without building on a pre-existing high level of political conflict leaders and mass opinion would come to believe that their countries could prosper by impoverishing or even attacking others. Is it possible that problems will not only become severe, but that people will entertain the thought that they have to be solved by war? While a pessimist could note that this argument does not appear as outlandish as it did before the financial crisis, an optimist could reply (correctly, in my view) that the very fact that we have seen such a sharp economic down-turn without anyone suggesting that force of arms is the solution shows that even if bad times bring about greater economic conflict, it will not make war thinkable.

In the past, the conflict of interest that has sparked war has involved territory more often than economic issues, although of course the two are often linked.46 Thus the rise of the security community has been accompanied by a decline in territorial conflicts, and reciprocal causation is surely at work here. Could territorial conflicts resume a salient place in relations among the leading power? Territory in the guise of self-determination continues, as the likely coming of a referendum on Scottish independence indicates. But a reduced attachment to territory is indicated by the fact that the rest of the UK is not willing to fight to prevent this, just as it would be willing to part with Northern Ireland if the majority of the inhabitants desired to join the Irish Republic. Indeed, the existence of a security community and the related decline in traditional security threats makes it easier for sub-national units to split off.

Concern for territory has not entirely disappeared, of course, and the recent Danish claim on large portions of the Arctic reminds us that changes in climate and technology can endow areas with new value.47 But the virulent disputes we see around the world stem from the break-up of states or the partition of areas of the globe previously ruled by others, and within the community it is hard to see either likely candidate territorial disputes or general trends that would return to traditional values. Could anything occur that would lead Germany to feel that it was vital to reclaim Alsace and Lorraine? If this were to happen, we would be in a different world. But to turn this around, we would have to be in a very different world for this to occur.

The security community is underpinned not only by the benefits it is believed to bring, but also by the perceived high costs of war. If large-scale conventional war would be very destructive, the presence of nuclear weapons pushes the costs off the scale (and it is worth remembering that although Germany and Japan do not have nuclear weapons, they could develop them very quickly). One does not have to accept all the precepts of standard deterrence theory to believe that it would take extraordinary incentives for the states to contemplate war with so many nuclear weapons scattered around. The other side of the coin is that the security community might be weakened if the costs of war were to become much less. The good news—from this perspective—is that there are few prospects of this. Even President Obama, who has stressed the need to abolish nuclear weapons, admits that this cannot be done in his lifetime. Missile defenses, endorsed by all American presidents since Reagan, remain out of reach, and no technologies or tactics are in sight that could render conventional war quick and relatively bloodless.

A more likely change would be an erosion of American hegemony. Among the leading powers, all are not equally leading. The strength, interests, and military presence of the US remain sufficient to see that others in the community do not challenge either it or each other. A decline in American power and a partial withdrawal of its influence are certainly possible, and at minimum, American troops might be withdrawn from Europe in the coming years. But would this matter? Even if American dominance played a large role in forming the community, it may not be necessary for the community’s maintenance. Path dependence may operate strongly here, and although firm evidence is hard to come by, I would argue that in the absence of other changes of the kind I have discussed, it is very unlikely that pulling off the American security blanket would lead to thoughts of war. (On the level of policy prescription, however, I am cautious enough not to want to run the experiment.)Pg. 13-20

#### Decline facilitates US multilateralism—paves the way for a soft landing that prevents their transition impacts.

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When US policymakers perceive a rising or a stable hegemony, the anarchic nature of the international system is no longer valid in the mind of US policymakers because the preponderant power makes the US immune from military threats. In the self-perceived, hierarchic international system with the US on the top, power-maximisation becomes the strategic goal of the US in part because of the ‘lust for power’ driven by human nature and in part because of the disappearance of the security constraints imposed by anarchy. Therefore, selective engagement and hegemonic dominion become two possible strategies for the US to maximise its power in the world. The larger the power gap between the US and others, the more likely selective engagement expands to hegemonic dominion. When US policymakers perceive a declining hegemony in that the power gap between the hegemon and others is narrowed rather than widened, US policymakers begin to change their hierarchic view of the international system. The rapid decline of relative power causes US policymakers to worry about security imposed by anarchy even though the US may remain the most powerful state in the system during the process of decline. Offshore balancing and multilateralism, therefore, become two possible policy options for the US to maximise its security under anarchy. The possible budget constraints during US decline may lead to military withdrawals from overseas bases. In addition, the US becomes more willing to pay the initial ‘lock-in’ price of multilateral institutions in order to constrain other states’ behaviour for its own security.

US foreign policy towards Asia preliminarily supports the power-perception hegemonic model. When President George H. W. Bush came to power, the US faced ‘dual deficits’ even though the US won the Cold War and became the hegemon by default in the early 1990s. The domestic economic difficulty imposed a declining, or at least uncertain, hegemony to the Bush administration. Consequently, Bush had to withdraw troops from Asia and conducted a reluctant offshore balancing strategy in the early 1990s. Although the US still claimed to keep its commitments to Asian allies, the US words with the sword became unreliable at best.

During President Clinton’s first tenure, how to revive US economy became the first priority of the administration. The perception of a declining hegemon did not totally fade until the middle of the 1990s when the US economy gradually came out of the recession. Multilateral institutions, especially APEC, became Clinton’s diplomatic weapon to open Asia’s market and boost US economy. In addition, the US also endorsed the ARF initiated by the ASEAN states in order to retain its eroding political and military influence after the strategic retreats in the early 1990s.

However, the US ‘new economy’ based on information technology and computers revived policymakers’ confidence in US hegemony after the Asian miracle was terminated by the 1997 economic crisis. The second part of the 1990s witnessed a rising US hegemony and the George W. Bush administration reached the apex of US power by any measure in the early 21st century. Therefore, since Clinton’s second tenure in the White House, US foreign policy in general and towards Asia in particular has become more assertive and power-driven in nature. Besides reconfirming its traditional military alliances in Asia, the US deepened its military engagement in the region through extensive security cooperation with other Asian states.

The selective engagement policy of the US in the late 1990s was substantially expanded by the Bush administration to hegemonic dominion after 9/11. The unrivalled hegemony relieved US of concerns over security threats from any other states in the international system. The ‘lust for power’ without constraints from anarchy drove US policymakers to pursue a hegemonic dominion policy in the world. The ‘pre-emption strategy’ and proactive missile defence programs reflected the power-maximising nature of the hegemonic dominion strategy during the George W. Bush administration.

What will the US do in the future? The power-perception hegemonic model suggests that the US cannot escape the fate of other great powers in history. When US hegemony is still rising or at a stable stage, no one can stop US expansion for more power. When its economy can no longer afford its power-oriented strategy, the US will face the same strategic burden of ‘imperial overstretch’ that Great Britain suffered in the 19th century. However, the power-perception hegemonic model also argues that US foreign policy depends on how US policymakers perceive the rise and fall of US hegemony.

If historical learning can help US policymakers cultivate a prudent perception regarding US hegemony, the early implementation of offshore balancing and multilateralism may facilitate the soft-landing of declining US hegemony. More importantly, the real danger is whether the US can make a right choice between power and security when US hegemony begins to decline. If US policymakers cannot learn from history but insist on seeking more power instead of security even though US hegemony is in decline, the likelihood of hegemonic war will increase. However, if US policymakers choose security over power when US hegemony is in decline, offshore balancing and multilateralism can help the US maximise security in the future anarchic, multipolar world. Pg. 1141-1143

\*Heg encourages power maximization

\*Decline forces them to worry about security. Leads to multilateralism/OSB

\*US willing to pay lock-in price to constrain peer competitor

\*1990’s prove

\*Multilateralism creates a soft landing during decline

#### Unipolarity is destroying bipartisan compact needed to sustain support for multilateralism—makes our policies erratic and incoherent.

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The conditions that sustained liberal internationalism have of late been rapidly disappearing, dramatically weakening its grip on the nation’s politics. Since the demise of the Soviet Union, U.S. primacy has reduced the incentives for Republicans and Democrats alike to adhere to the liberal internationalist compact. Unipolarity has heightened the geopolitical appeal of unilateralism, a trend that even the threat of transnational terrorism has not reversed. Unipolarity has also loosened the political discipline engendered by the Cold War threat, leaving U.S. foreign policy more vulnerable to growing partisanship at home. “Red” and “Blue” America disagree about the nature of U.S. engagement in the world; growing disparities in wealth have reawakened class tensions; and political pragmatism has been losing ground to ideological extremism.

The polarization of the United States has dealt a severe blow to the bipartisan compact between power and cooperation. Instead of adhering to the vital center, the country’s elected officials, along with the public, are backing away from the liberal internationalist compact, supporting either U.S. power or international cooperation, but rarely both. President Bush and many Republicans have abandoned one side of the liberal internationalist compact: multilateralism has received little but contempt on their watch. Meanwhile, the Democrats have neglected the other side: many party stalwarts are uneasy with the assertive use of U.S. power. As the partisan gyre in Washington widens, the political center is dying out, and support for liberal internationalism is dying with it. According to Jim Leach, one of the Republican moderates to lose his House seat in the 2006 midterm elections, “[The United States’] middle has virtually collapsed. And how to reconstruct a principled center, a center of gravity in American politics, may be the hardest single thing at this particular time.”5

Prominent voices from across the political spectrum have called for the restoration of a robust bipartisan center that can put U.S. grand strategy back on track.6 According to Democratic Senator Hillary Clinton, “For more than a half a century, we know that we prospered because of a bipartisan consensus on defense and foreign policy. We must do more than return to that sensible, cooperative approach.” Republican presidential candidate Mitt Romney echoes this sentiment: “It seems that concern aboutWashington’s divisiveness and capability to meet today’s challenges is the one thing that unites us all. We need new thinking on foreign policy and an overarching strategy that can unite the United States and its allies.”7

These exhortations are in vain. The halcyon era of liberal internationalism is over; the bipartisan compact between power and partnership has been effectively dismantled. If left unattended, the political foundations of U.S. statecraft will continue to disintegrate, exposing the country to the dangers of an erratic and incoherent foreign policy. To avoid this fate, U.S. leaders will have to fashion a new brand of internationalism—one that will necessarily entail less power and less partnership if it is to have a chance of securing broad domestic support. To find a new equilibrium between the nation’s commitments abroad and its polarized politics at home, the United States will need a grand strategy that is as selective and judicious as it is purposeful. Pg. 8-10

#### Multilat leads to global coop and power sharing—it creates shared framework of interaction changes the way states interpret global politics

Pouliot 11—Professor of Poli Sci @ McGill University [Vincent Pouliot, “Multilateralism as an End in Itself,” International Studies Perspectives (2011) 12, 18–26]

Because it rests on open, nondiscriminatory debate, and the routine exchange of viewpoints, the multilateral procedure introduces three key advantages that are gained, regardless of the specific policies adopted, and tend to diffuse across all participants. Contrary to the standard viewpoint, according to which a rational preference or functional imperative lead to multilateral cooperation, here it is the systematic practice of multilateralism that creates the drive to cooperate. At the theoretical level, the premise is that it is not only what people think that explains what they do, but also what they do that determines what they think (Pouliot 2010). Everyday multilateralism is a self-fulfilling practice for at least three reasons.

First, the joint practice of multilateralism creates mutually recognizable patterns of action among global actors. This process owes to the fact that practices structure social interaction (Adler and Pouliot forthcoming).2 Because they are meaningful, organized, and repeated, practices generally convey a degree of mutual intelligibility that allows people to develop social relations over time. In the field of international security, for example, the practice of deterrence is premised on a limited number of gestures, signals, and linguistic devices that are meant, as Schelling (1966:113) put it, to ‘‘getting the right signal across.’’ The same goes with the practice of multilateralism, which rests on a set of political and social patterns that establish the boundaries of action in a mutually intelligible fashion. These structuring effects, in turn, allow for the development of common frameworks for appraising global events. Multilateral dialog serves not only to find joint solutions; it also makes it possible for various actors to zoom in on the definition of the issue at hand—a particularly important step on the global stage.

The point is certainly not that the multilateral procedure leads everybody to agree on everything—that would be as impossible as counterproductive. Theoretically speaking, there is room for skepticism that multilateralism may ever allow communicative rationality at the global level (see Risse 2000; Diez and Steans 2005). With such a diverse and uneven playing field, one can doubt that discursive engagement, in and of itself, can lead to common lifeworlds. Instead, what the practice of multilateralism fosters is the emergence of a shared framework of interaction—for example, a common linguistic repertoire—that allows global actors to make sense of world politics in mutually recognizable ways. Of course, they may not agree on the specific actions to be taken, but at least they can build on an established pattern of political interaction to deal with the problem at hand—sometimes even before it emerges in acute form. In today’s pluralistic world, that would already be a considerable achievement.

In that sense, multilateralism may well be a constitutive practice of what Lu (2009) calls ‘‘political friendship among peoples.’’ The axiomatic practice of principled and inclusive dialog is quite apparent in the way she describes this social structure: ‘‘While conflicts, especially over the distribution of goods and burdens, will inevitably arise, under conditions of political friendship among peoples, they will be negotiated within a global background context of norms and institutions based on mutual recognition, equity in the distribution of burdens and benefits of global cooperation, and power-sharing in the institutions of global governance rather than domination by any group’’ (2009:54–55). In a world where multilateralism becomes an end in itself, this ideal pattern emerges out of the structuring effects of axiomatic practice: take the case of NATO, for instance, which has recently had to manage, through the multilateral practice, fairly strong internal dissent (Pouliot 2006). While clashing views and interests will never go away in our particularly diverse world, as pessimists are quick to emphasize (for example, Dahl 1999), the management of discord is certainly made easier by shared patterns of dialog based on mutually recognizable frameworks.

Second, the multilateral procedure typically ensures a remarkable level of moderation in the global policies adopted. In fact, a quick historical tour d’horizon suggests that actors engaged in multilateralism tend to avoid radical solutions in their joint decision making. Of course, the very process of uniting disparate voices helps explain why multilateralism tends to produce median consensus. This is not to say that the multilateral practice inevitably leads to lowest common denominators. To repeat, because it entails complex and often painstaking debate before any actions are taken, the multilateral procedure forces involved actors to devise and potentially share similar analytical lenses that, in hindsight, make the policies adopted seem inherently, and seemingly ‘‘naturally,’’ moderate. This is because the debate about what a given policy means takes place before its implementation, which makes for a much smoother ride when decisions hit the ground. This joint interpretive work, which constitutes a crucial aspect of multilateralism, creates outcomes that are generally perceived as inherently reasonable. Participation brings inherent benefits to politics, as Bachrach (1975) argued in the context of democratic theory. Going after the conventional liberal view according to which actors enter politics with an already fixed set of preferences, Bachrach observes that most of the time people define their interests in the very process of participation. The argument is not that interests formed in the course of social interaction are in any sense more altruistic. It rather is that the nature and process of political practices, in this case multilateralism, matter a great deal in shaping participants’ preferences (Wendt 1999). In this sense, not only does the multilateral practice have structuring effects on global governance, but it is also constitutive of what actors say, want, and do (Adler and Pouliot forthcoming).

Third and related, multilateralism lends legitimacy to the policies that it generates by virtue of the debate that the process necessarily entails. There is no need here to explain at length how deliberative processes that are inclusive of all stakeholders tend to produce outcomes that are generally considered more socially and politically acceptable. In the long run, the large ownership also leads to more efficient implementation, because actors feel invested in the enactment of solutions on the ground. Even episodes of political failure, such as the lack of UN reaction to the Rwandan genocide, can generate useful lessons when re-appropriated multilaterally—think of the Responsibility to Protect, for instance.3 From this outlook, there is no contradiction between efficiency and the axiomatic practice of multilateralism, quite the contrary. The more multilateralism becomes the normal or self-evident practice of global governance, the more benefits it yields for the many stakeholders of global governance. In fact, multilateralism as an end in and of itself could generate even more diffuse reciprocity than Ruggie had originally envisioned. Not only do its distributional consequences tend to even out, multilateralism as a global governance routine also creates self-reinforcing dynamics and new focal points for strategic interaction. The axiomatic practice of multilateralism helps define problems in commensurable ways and craft moderate solutions with wide-ranging ownership—three processual benefits that further strengthen the impetus for multilateral dialog. Pg. 21-23

#### That cooperation is key to planetary survival—weak regulations risk extinction.

Masciulli 11—Professor of Political Science @ St Thomas University [Joseph Masciulli, “The Governance Challenge for Global Political and Technoscientific Leaders in an Era of Globalization and Globalizing Technologies,” Bulletin of Science, Technology & Society February 2011 vol. 31 no. 1 pg. 3-5]

What is most to be feared is enhanced global disorder resulting from the combination of weak global regulations; the unforeseen destructive consequences of converging technologies and economic globalization; military competition among the great powers; and the prevalent biases of short-term thinking held by most leaders and elites. But no practical person would wish that such a disorder scenario come true, given all the weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) available now or which will surely become available in the foreseeable future. As converging technologies united by IT, cognitive science, nanotechnology, and robotics advance synergistically in monitored and unmonitored laboratories, we may be blindsided by these future developments brought about by technoscientists with a variety of good or destructive or mercenary motives. The current laudable but problematic openness about publishing scientific results on the Internet would contribute greatly to such negative outcomes.

To be sure, if the global disorder-emergency scenario occurred because of postmodern terrorism or rogue states using biological, chemical, or nuclear WMDs, or a regional war with nuclear weapons in the Middle East or South Asia, there might well be a positive result for global governance. Such a global emergency might unite the global great and major powers in the conviction that a global concert was necessary for their survival and planetary survival as well. In such a global great power concert, basic rules of economic, security, and legal order would be uncompromisingly enforced both globally and in the particular regions where they held hegemonic status. That concert scenario, however, is flawed by the limited legitimacy of its structure based on the members having the greatest hard and soft power on planet Earth.

At the base of our concerns, I would argue, are human proclivities for narrow, short-term thinking tied to individual self-interest or corporate and national interests in decision making. For globalization, though propelled by technologies of various kinds, “remains an essentially human phenomenon . . . and the main drivers for the establishment and uses of disseminative systems are hardy perennials: profit, convenience, greed, relative advantage, curiosity, demonstrations of prowess, ideological fervor, malign destructiveness.” These human drives and capacities will not disappear. Their “manifestations now extend considerably beyond more familiarly empowered governmental, technoscientific and corporate actors to include even individuals: terrorists, computer hackers and rogue market traders” (Whitman, 2005, p. 104).

In this dangerous world, if people are to have their human dignity recognized and enjoy their human rights, above all, to life, security, a healthy environment, and freedom, we need new forms of comprehensive global regulation and control. Such effective global leadership and governance with robust enforcement powers alone can adequately respond to destructive current global problems, and prevent new ones. However, successful human adaptation and innovation to our current complex environment through the social construction of effective global governance will be a daunting collective task for global political and technoscientific leaders and citizens. For our global society is caught in “the whirlpool of an accelerating process of modernization” that has for the most part “been left to its own devices” (Habermas, 2001, p. 112). We need to progress in human adaptation to and innovation for our complex and problematical global social and natural planetary environments through global governance. I suggest we need to begin by ending the prevalent biases of short-termism in thinking and acting and the false values attached to the narrow self-interest of individuals, corporations, and states.

I agree with Stephen Hawking that the long-term future of the human race must be in space. It will be difficult enough to avoid disaster on planet Earth in the next hundred years, let alone the next thousand, or million. . . . There have been a number of times in the past when its survival has been a question of touch and go. The Cuban missile crisis in 1962 was one of these. The frequency of such occasions is likely to increase in the future. We shall need great care and judgment to negotiate them all successfully. But I’m an optimist. If we can avoid disaster for the next two centuries, our species should be safe, as we spread into space. . . . But we are entering an increasingly dangerous period of our history. Our population and our use of the finite resources of planet Earth, are growing exponentially, along with our technical ability to change the environment for good or ill. But our genetic code still carries the selfish and aggressive instincts that were of survival advantage in the past. . . . Our only chance of long term survival is not to remain inward looking on planet Earth, but to spread out into space. We have made remarkable progress in the last hundred years. But if we want to continue beyond the next hundred years, our future is in space.” (Hawking, 2010)

Nonetheless, to reinvent humanity pluralistically in outer space and beyond will require securing our one and only global society and planet Earth through effective global governance in the foreseeable future. And our dilemma is that the enforcement powers of multilateral institutions are not likely to be strengthened because of the competition for greater (relative, not absolute) hard and soft power by the great and major powers. They seek their national or alliance superiority, or at least, parity, for the sake of their state’s survival and security now. Unless the global disorder-emergency scenario was to occur soon—God forbid—the great powers will most likely, recklessly and tragically, leave global survival and security to their longer term agendas. Pg. 4-5

#### AND, unipolarity directly trades off with US leadership.

Ikenberry 6—Professor of Politics and International Affairs @ Princeton University [G. John Ikenberry, Liberal International Theory in the Wake of 911 and American Unipolarity, 22 January 2006, pg. <http://tinyurl.com/6v3vtyy>]

Liberalism and American Hegemony - A final crisis point in liberal internationalism is that the postwar liberal project depended on enlightened American hegemony—and now that hegemony is more problematic. Like the balance of power, American hegemony has been more of a pre-condition for the emergence of liberal order than its champions might admit. But the character of that hegemony is under strain and changing.

For half a century, the United States held the keys to global order—and in many ways it still does today. If America engages in the right amount of commitment and restraint—anchoring its power in partnerships, alliances, multilateral institutions, "special relationships," and governance regimes -- the overall international system will tend to remain stable, open, and integrated. The world has, in effect, "contracted out" to the United States to provide global governance. The United States provides public goods, frameworks of cooperation, "good offices," and an enlightened but U.S.-centered system of rules and modes of doing geopolitical business. In return, the world "bandwagons" with the U.S. rather than resists or balances against it. This special type of open or liberal American hegemony trumps any other type of rival global order—and all the key players in world politics know this to be true. So no great power or regional grouping has an incentive to challenge or overturn the current order. It is a quintessential American vision—the great diversity of peoples and societies around the world will together troop down a grand pathway to modernity. Again, if the United States understands the logic of its own system and runs it correctly, this American-style liberal hegemonic order can last indefinitely.

A grand bargain stands behind this American-led liberal order. In the past, the United States provided global “services”—such as security protection and support for open markets—which made other states willing to work with rather than resist American preeminence. The public goods provision tended to make it worthwhile for these states to endure the day-to-day irritations of American foreign policy. But the trade-off seems to be shifting. Today, the United States appears to be providing fewer global public goods while at the same time the irritations associate with American dominance appear to be are growing.

It might be useful to think of this dynamic this way: the United States is unique in that it is simultaneously both the provider of “global governance” -- through what has tended in the past to be the exercise of “liberal” hegemony—and it is a great power that pursues its own national interest. America’s liberal hegemonic role is manifest when it champions the WTO, engages in international rule or regime creation, or reaffirms its commitment to cooperative security in Asia and Europe. Its great power role is manifest, for example, when it seeks to protect its domestic steel or textile industry. When it acts as a liberal hegemon, it is seeking to lead or manage the global system of rules and institutions; when it is acting as a nationalist great power, it is seeking to respond to domestic interests and its relative power position. My point is that today, these two roles—liberal hegemon and traditional great power—are increasingly in conflict.30

So the danger to liberal internationalism lies with its greatest champion. The United States does not appear to be doing as much today as in the past to sponsor and operate within a system of consensual rule-based governance. Why the United States is less willing to do so is actually a complex issue. Some of it is very specifically about the Bush administration—and therefore these biases and viewpoints will pass from the scene eventually as Bush and his team leave office. But America’s global position and the structure of incentives that this setting generates is also part of the explanation. American unipolarity seems to have created problems in how the U.S. thinks about the provision of international rules, institutions, and public goods.

CONCLUSION - The United States, together with allied European and East Asian partners, created a distinctive type of international order—organized around open markets, social bargains, intergovernmental institutions, and cooperative security. This political order was cemented by both the hegemonic power of the United States and the unusual bonds of cooperation that are possible among democracies. Today this order is in jeopardy. The United States is deeply ambivalent about making institutional commitments and binding itself to other states—ambivalence and hesitation that has been exacerbated by the end of the Cold War, American unipolarity, and new security threats. But the United States still possesses profound incentives to build and operate within a liberal rule-based order. Just as importantly, that order is now not simply an extension of American power and interests—it has taken on a life of its own. American power may rise or fall and its foreign policy ideology may wax and wane between multilateral and imperial impulses—but the wider and deeper liberal global order is now a reality that America itself must accommodate itself to.

### 2NC Fettweis—Empirics

#### AND, their authors ignore the foreign policy options other countries—makes their theoretical predictions bankrupt.

Hurrell 6—Director of the Centre for International Studies @ University of Oxford [Andrew Hurrell, “Hegemony, liberalism and global order: what space for would-be great powers?” International Affairs 82, 1 (2006) 1‒19]

Neo-realist theory has generated an enormous and sophisticated literature with many subtheories and competing diagnoses. It is, however, limited in a number of important ways. In the first place, most of this literature is written from the perspective of the United States and is implicitly or explicitly preoccupied with the strategies that the US has adopted, or should adopt, to sustain its advantageous position in the system. Second, the foreign policy choices of second-tier states are arrived at deductively, irrespective of whether or not they correspond particularly closely either to policy options that have actually been adopted or to understandings of those choices within second-tier states themselves. Third, the options are underspecified: What precisely does ‘bandwagoning’ consist of, and what determines the choice among the very different forms that ‘alignment’ with the hegemon might take? Does bandwagoning describe a pattern of behaviour or a conscious policy choice? Is it useful to distinguish between hard and soft forms of balancing? What of other options such as ‘hiding’ or ‘hedging’? Finally, neo-realism sees the system only in terms of the distribution of power. Systemic forces are indeed crucial; but, as foreign policy analysis of the countries under consideration here clearly demonstrates, there is much more in the system than is contained in neo-realist theory, and this matters not just for accurate empirical analysis but also for the development of successful theory. Pg. 6

#### Their defense of unipolarity is plagued by conceptual confusion and methodological laziness.

Yang 10—Ph.D Candidate in the Politics & International Relations Program @ University of Southern California [Xiangfeng Yang, The Unipolar Challenge: Power, Culture and Authority and the Advent of War, March 25, 2010, pg. <http://www.stockholm.sgir.eu/uploads/The%20Unipolar%20Challenge,%203rd%20Draft.pdf>]

Turning the conventional wisdom on its head, the positivist intellectual enterprise on unipolarity is seriously impeded by not just conceptual confusion but also the lack of methodological rigor. Conceptually, most researchers, many realists included, are slow to realize that the character of unipolarity is fundamentally different phenomenon from bipolarity and multipolarity and that the study of unipolarity presupposes a new set of analytical assumptions most of the time, if not always. Methodologically and theoretically, the obsession with contemporary US hegemony gives the impression that unipolarity is historically unprecedented, such that scholars use the evidence based on which their hypotheses are developed to test their theoretical propositions, a huge taboo in positivist research (King, Keohane, & Verba, 1994). The upshot is often that their policy projections leap far ahead of their theoretical and empirical analyses: the same evidence can be interpreted in rather divergent ways, or that the falsification of their theory still awaits what China or the United States will do in the future.8 pg. 13

### AT: Miscalc

#### Accidental nuclear war is science fiction. Motives are for de-escalation not escalation.

Quinlan 9 (Michael, Former Permanent Under-Sec. State—UK Ministry of Defense, “Thinking about Nuclear Weapons: Principles, Problems, Prospects”, p. 63-69)

Even if initial nuclear use did not quickly end the fighting, the supposition of inexorable momentum in a developing exchange, with each side rushing to overreaction amid confusion and uncertainty, is implausible. It fails to consider what the situation of the decisionmakers would really be. Neither side could want escalation. Both would be appalled at what was going on. Both would be desperately looking for signs that the other was ready to call a halt. Both, given the capacity for evasion or concealment which modem delivery platforms and vehicles can possess, could have in reserve significant forces invulnerable enough not to entail use-or-lose pressures. (It may be more open to question, as noted earlier, whether newer nuclearweapon possessors can be immediately in that position; but it is within reach of any substantial state with advanced technological capabilities, and attaining it is certain to be a high priority in the development of forces.) As a result, neither side can have any predisposition to suppose, in an ambiguous situation of fearful risk, that the right course when in doubt is to go on copiously launching weapons. And none of this analysis rests on any presumption of highly subtle or pre-concerted rationality. The rationality required is plain. The argument is reinforced if we consider the possible reasoning of an aggressor at a more dispassionate level. Any substantial nuclear armoury can inflict destruction outweighing any possible prize that aggression could hope to seize. A state attacking the possessor of such an armoury must therefore be doing so (once given that it cannot count upon destroying the armoury pre-emptively) on a judgement that the possessor would be found lacking in the will to use it. If the attacked possessor used nuclear weapons, whether first or in response to the aggressor's own first use, this judgement would begin to look dangerously precarious. There must be at least a substantial possibility of the aggressor leaders' concluding that their initial judgement had been mistaken—that the risks were after all greater than whatever prize they had been seeking, and that for their own country's , survival they must call off the aggression. Deterrence planning such as that of NATO was directed in the first place to preventing the initial misjudgement and in the second, if it were nevertheless made, to compelling such a reappraisal. The former aim had to have primacy, because it could not be taken for granted that the latter was certain to work. But there was no ground for assuming in advance, for all possible scenarios, that the chance of its working must be negligible. An aggressor state would itself be at huge risk if nuclear war developed, as its leaders would know. It may be argued that a policy which abandons hope of physically defeating theznemy and simply hopes to get him to desist is pure gamble, a matter of who blinks first; and that the political and moral nature of most likely aggressors, almost ex hypothesi, makes them the less likely to blink. One response to this is to ask what is the alternative—it can only be surrender. But a more positive and hopeful answer lies in the fact that the criticism is posed in a political vacuum. Real-life conflict would have a political context. The context which concerned NATO during the cold war, for example, was one of defending vital interests against a postlated aggressor whose own vital interests would not be engaged, or would be less engaged. Certainty is not possible, but a clear asymmetry of vital interest is a legitimate basis for expecting an asymmetry, credible to both sides, of resolve in conflict. That places upon statesmen, as page 23 has noted, the key task in deterrence of building up in advance a clear and shared grasp of where limits lie. That was plainly achieved in cold-war Europe. If vital interests have been defined in a way that is dear, and also clearly not overlapping or incompatible with those of the adversary, a credible basis has been laid for the likelihood of greater resolve in resistance. It was also sometimes suggested by critics that whatever might be indicated by theoretical discussion of political will and interests, the military environment of nuclear warfare—particularly difficulties of communication and control—would drive escalation with overwhelming probability to the limit. But it is obscure why matters should be regarded as inevitably .so for every possible level and setting of action. Even if the history of war suggested (as it scarcely does) that military decision-makers are mostly apt to work on the principle 'When in doubt, lash out', the nuclear revolution creates an utterly new situation. The pervasive reality, always plain to both sides during the cold war, is `If this goes on to the end, we are all ruined'. Given that inexorable escalation would mean catastrophe for both, it would be perverse to suppose them permanently incapable of framing arrangements which avoid it. As page 16 has noted, NATO gave its military commanders no widespread delegated authority, in peace or war, to launch nuclear weapons without specific political direction. Many types of weapon moreover had physical safeguards such as PALs incorporated to reinforce organizational ones. There were multiple communication and control systems for passing information, orders, and prohibitions. Such systems could not be totally guaranteed against disruption if at a fairly intense level of strategic exchange—which was only one of many possible levels of conflict— an adversary judged it to be in his interest to weaken political control. It was far from clear why he necessarily should so judge. Even then, however, it remained possible to operate on a general fail-safe presumption: no authorization, no use. That was the basis on which NATO operated. If it is feared that the arrangements which 1 a nuclear-weapon possessor has in place do not meet such standards in some respects, the logical course is to continue to improve them rather than to assume escalation to be certain and uncontrollable, with all the enormous inferences that would have to flow from such an assumption. The likelihood of escalation can never be 100 per cent, and never zero. Where between those two extremes it may lie can never be precisely calculable in advance; and even were it so calculable, it would not be uniquely fixed—it would stand to vary hugely with circumstances. That there should be any risk at all of escalation to widespread nuclear war must be deeply disturbing, and decision-makers would always have to weigh it most anxiously. But a pair of key truths about it need to be recognized. The first is that the risk of escalation to large-scale nuclear war is inescapably present in any significant armed conflict between nuclear-capable powers, whoever may have started the conflict and whoever may first have used any particular category of weapon. The initiator of the conflict will always have physically available to him options for applying more force if he meets effective resistance. If the risk of escalation, whatever its degree of probability, is to be regarded as absolutely unacceptable, the necessary inference is that a state attacked by a substantial nuclear power must forgo military resistance. It must surrender, even if it has a nuclear armoury of its own. But the companion truth is that, as page 47 has noted, the risk of escalation is an inescapable burden also upon the aggressor. The exploitation of that burden is the crucial route, if conflict does break out, for managing it, to a tolerable outcome--the only route, indeed, intermediate between surrender and holocaust, and so the necessary basis for deterrence beforehand. The working out of plans to exploit escalation risk most effectively in deterring potential aggression entails further and complex issues. It is for example plainly desirable, wherever geography, politics, and available resources so permit without triggering arms races, to make provisions and dispositions that are likely to place the onus of making the bigger, and more evidently dangerous steps in escalation upon the aggressor volib wishes to maintain his attack, rather than upon the defender. (The customary shorthand for this desirable posture used to be 'escalation dominance'.) These issues are not further discussed here. But addressing them needs to start from acknowledgement that there are in any event no certainties or absolutes available, no options guaranteed to be risk-free and cost-free. Deterrence is not possible without escalation risk; and its presence can point to no automatic policy conclusion save for those who espouse outright pacifism and accept its consequences. Accident and Miscalculation Ensuring the safety and security of nuclear weapons plainly needs to be taken most seriously. Detailed information is understandably not published, but such direct evidence as there is suggests that it always has been so taken in every possessor state, with the inevitable occasional failures to follow strict procedures dealt with rigorously. Critics have nevertheless from time to time argued that the possibility of accident involving nuclear weapons is so substantial that it must weigh heavily in the entire evaluation of whether war-prevention structures entailing their existence should be tolerated at all. Two sorts of scenario are usually in question. The first is that of a single grave event involving an unintended nuclear explosion—a technical disaster at a storage site, for example, Dr the accidental or unauthorized launch of a delivery system with a live nuclear warhead. The second is that of some event—perhaps such an explosion or launch, or some other mishap such as malfunction or misinterpretation of radar signals or computer systems—initiating a sequence of response and counter-response that culminated in a nuclear exchange which no one had truly intended. No event that is physically possible can be said to be of absolutely zero probability (just as at an opposite extreme it is absurd to claim, as has been heard from distinguished figures, that nuclear-weapon use can be guaranteed to happen within some finite future span despite not having happened for over sixty years). But human affairs cannot be managed to the standard of either zero or total probability. We have to assess levels between those theoretical limits and weigh their reality and implications against other factors, in security planning as in everyday life. There have certainly been, across the decades since 1945, many known accidents involving nuclear weapons, from transporters skidding off roads to bomber aircraft crashing with or accidentally dropping the weapons they carried (in past days when such carriage was a frequent feature of readiness arrangements----it no longer is). A few of these accidents may have released into the nearby environment highly toxic material. None however has entailed a nuclear detonation. Some commentators suggest that this reflects bizarrely good fortune amid such massive activity and deployment over so many years. A more rational deduction from the facts of this long experience would however be that the probability of any accident triggering a nuclear explosion is extremely low. It might be further noted that the mechanisms needed to set off such an explosion are technically demanding, and that in a large number of ways the past sixty years have seen extensive improvements in safety arrangements for both the design and the handling of weapons. It is undoubtedly possible to see respects in which, after the cold war, some of the factors bearing upon risk may be new or more adverse; but some are now plainly less so. The years which the world has come through entirely without accidental or unauthorized detonation have included early decades in which knowledge was sketchier, precautions were less developed, and weapon designs were less ultra-safe than they later became, as well as substantial periods in which weapon numbers were larger, deployments more widespread and diverse, movements more frequent, and several aspects of doctrine and readiness arrangements more tense. Similar considerations apply to the hypothesis of nuclear war being mistakenly triggered by false alarm. Critics again point to the fact, as it is understood, of numerous occasions when initial steps in alert sequences for US nuclear forces were embarked upon, or at least called for, by, indicators mistaken or misconstrued. In none of these instances, it is accepted, did matters get at all near to nuclear launch--extraordinary good fortune again, critics have suggested. But the rival and more logical inference from hundreds of events stretching over sixty years of experience presents itself once more: that the probability of initial misinterpretation leading far towards mistaken launch is remote. Precisely because any nuclear-weapon possessor recognizes the vast gravity of any launch, release sequences have many steps, and human decision is repeatedly interposed as well as capping the sequences. To convey that because a first step was prompted the world somehow came close to accidental nuclear war is wild hyperbole, rather like asserting, when a tennis champion has lost his opening service game, that he was nearly beaten in straight sets. History anyway scarcely offers any ready example of major war started by accident even before the nuclear revolution imposed an order-of-magnitude increase in caution. It was occasionally conjectured that nuclear war might be triggered by the real but accidental or unauthorized launch of a strategic nuclear-weapon delivery system in the direction of a potential adversary. No such launch is known to have occurred in over sixty years. The probability of it is therefore very low. But even if it did happen, the further hypothesis of it initiating a general nuclear exchange is far-fetched. It fails to consider the real situation of decision-makers as pages 63-4 have brought out. The notion that cosmic holocaust might be mistakenly precipitated in this way belongs to science fiction.

### AT: Kagan & O’Hanlon

#### Kagan and O’Hanlon’s methodology should be rejected—they’re just neocon hacks that recycle the same tired war propaganda.

Justin Raimondo, Editorial Director of Antiwar.com, contributing editor for The American Conservative, senior fellow at the Randolph Bourne Institute, Adjunct Scholar with the Ludwig von Mises Institute, 2007 (“Invade Pakistan?,” AntiWar.com, November 22nd, Available Online at http://original.antiwar.com/justin/2007/11/21/invade-pakistan/, Accessed 09-07-2010)

That’s the hallmark of the Kagan-O’Hanlon method, which is also the methodology of the neoconservatives, whose arguments they synopsize and sell to policymakers as products of the "bipartisan center": conflating wildly disparate elements and somehow always linking them all to al-Qaeda. That has been the modus operandi of the War Party from the very beginning of this increasingly ugly episode in American history. Iraq was said to be in cahoots with Osama. Then it was Iran, according to such impeccable sources as Michael Ledeen. As I’ve remarked before, they don’t even have to produce fresh war propaganda: all they have to do is substitute Pakistan or Iran where it used to say Iraq, and they have a pro-war talking point, good as new.

#### The Kagans are shills for the military establishment, not scholarly experts—disregard their politically-motivated rants.

Kelley Beaucar Vlahos, freelance writer, long-time political reporter for FoxNews.com, contributing editor at The American Conservative, and Washington correspondent for Homeland Security Today magazine, 2009 (“The Two Faces of Kimberly Kagan,” Antiwar.com, September 29th, Available Online at http://original.antiwar.com/vlahos/2009/09/28/two-faces-of-kimberly-kagan/, Accessed 09-07-2010)

If Gen. Stanley McChrystal is to get his way – that is, convince the administration to give him more blood and treasure to sacrifice to COIN in Afghanistan – he needs to have a few secret weapons at his disposal.

And there is nothing better than having a couple Kagans up your sleeve. Particularly Kimberly Kagan, who, like a drill bit hammering through concrete, has been virtually ubiquitous and unrelenting in her ability to stay on message, and downright stealthy in advancing an obvious political agenda while playing the geeky, bespectacled military scholar.

"Of course it’s fun to read Caesar. It’s fun to read Thucydides. It’s fun to read Polybius and learn about the concept of war in ancient times," she pronounced to Brian Lamb in an interview about herself and her new think-tank, the nonpartisan Institute for the Study of War, in 2007.

A year later, she and her husband Frederick Kagan would pen what can only be described as a detailed military panegyric to Generals David Petraeus and Raymond Odierno, who "redefined the operational art of counterinsurgency" through a tactical campaign the Kagans were very much familiar with, widely known to us mortals as "The Surge" in Iraq.

"Great commanders often come in pairs: Eisenhower and Patton, Grant and Sherman, Napoleon and Davout, Marlborough and Eugene, Caesar and Labienus. Generals David Petraeus and Raymond Odierno can now be added to the list," the Kagans gushed in the 4,536-word testimonial.

This kind of hagiography may appear over-the-top, but it has served its scribes well. The Kagans’ own success as courtier-scholars in the Imperial City relies on building and maintaining the successful Surge narrative. One year after "Patton" and three months after issuing "How to Surge the Taliban" for the New York Times with fellow neoconservative Max Boot, both Kimberly and Fred were injected into the new commander’s tight inner circle for the next Surge experiment in Afghanistan.

Though it’s obvious why McChrystal, a Petraeus insider who "gets" COIN, would tap Team Kagan, one wonders why the general proceeded with the time-wasting kabuki performance that was the two-month "strategic assessment" of Afghanistan to begin with. When you put two Kagans, Andrew Exum, Stephen Biddle, Tony Cordesman, and a tiny cast of unknowns together for a brainstorm on the military’s dime, it shouldn’t be a surprise when the final recommendations come back without an exit strategy.

Not that Fred and Kimberly offered even the illusion of receptivity, as they both churned out one argument after another for Surge II before and after they "reviewed" Afghanistan with the team. And, as if on cue, the same day the Washington Post published a leaked version of McChrystal’s final report, saying he needed more troops or else "mission failure" would ensue, the Kagans conveniently announced their own new and improved strategy for Afghanistan. The report, "A Comprehensive Strategy for Afghanistan: Afghanistan Force Requirements," involves a recommendation for 40,000 to 45,000 additional American troops on the ground and a level of detail not seen since, well, Fred Kagan announced "Choosing Victory: A Plan for Success in Iraq," otherwise known as the Surge blueprint, with Petraeus’ mentor, former Gen. Jack Keane, at the American Enterprise Institute in Dec. 2006.

Kimberly Kagan: Military Geek or Surge Automaton?

The warhawks have been winding up for a major offensive against the Obama administration for weeks now. Their effort to push ahead with Surge II is getting a capable assist from liberal neo-interventionists and COIN operators eager to replicate what they see as a success in Iraq. The Kagans, as chief architects of this "success," have been rewarded accordingly with the largely unquestioned notion that they are now "brilliant military strategists," points out Jim Lobe, Washington bureau chief of Inter Press Service.

"[The Kagans] are given credit for having snatched victory in Iraq from the jaws of defeat," Lobe tells Antiwar.com. "You would think the Kagans and other neoconservatives would be discredited because of their advocacy of the Iraq War itself. But they aren’t."

Instead, Kimberly Kagan has increasingly become a spear point for advancing the counterinsurgency in Afghanistan. And why not? She is young, attractive in that wonky, austere Washingtonian way, and seemingly unflappable as she discharges fusillades of talking points like a machine gun. One look at her March 2007 performance on Washington Journal circa Surge I and it’s clear why Kagan has replaced the old neoconservative guard as a primary surrogate for the cause.

During the Surge, Kagan was prolific in her "Iraq Reports" for The Weekly Standard. Recreating her "battlefield circulations," her front line missives conveyed the Surge in a way that can only be described as "strategic communications" in motion. When the magazine announced Kagan’s series, The Atlantic’s Andrew Sullivan wisely pointed out its superficiality in a post, "Mrs. Kagan Reviews Her Own Idea (And Her Husband’s)":

"Kimberly Kagan is listed as one of the participants in her husband’s research team that came up with the surge in the first place. So when the Weekly Standard decided to compile a regular report on the surge’s progress, they picked the wife of the main author and one of the plan’s original architects. And they never disclosed these relevant facts. So allow me."

Nevertheless, her reports were largely passed off as research, even journalism, rather than political ammunition, and she wrote a book about it last year, The Surge: A Military History, another encomium to Petraeus and Co. and the altar of COIN. Her other published work, The Eye of Command, based on her 2000 Yale dissertation, The Face of Battle, the Eye of Command, was published by the University of Michigan Press in 2006.

Burrowing oneself in the bosom of an enterprise in this way – in Kagan’s case, defending a perpetual state of U.S. militarism for the Global War on Terrorism – is the lifeblood of Washington politics. That would be perfectly understood if Kagan had presented herself as a political agent in the first place, but she does not. She is consistently introduced in the halls of military power and political influence in Washington as a scholar of history, emphasizing her credentials as a Yale Ph.D. and former assistant professor at West Point (2000-2005), with brief teaching/lecturing stints at Georgetown, Yale, and American Universities.

But in fact, her entire professional career as a military scholar has taken place in the last decade, and for most of that time she has served as a vocal advocate for controversial interventionist policies on behalf of Republican interests, the Bush White House, and now, the U.S. military.

The Web site for her nearly three-year-old nonprofit think-tank says its mission is "to educate current and future decision makers and thereby enhance the quality of policy debates. The Institute’s work is addressed to government officials and legislators, teachers and students, business executives, professionals, journalists, and all citizens interested in a serious understanding of war and government policy."

During the aforementioned interview with Brian Lamb, Kagan said she started the Institute for the Understanding of War "to communicate what I had learned from [West Point military colleagues] to other civilians knowing full well that if I could learn [military history and doctrine] as an intellectual discipline, so could other people."

But one click onto the organization’s Web site and it becomes clear that the institute is all about pushing a specific doctrine, not "enhancing the quality of policy debates." It is riddled with op-eds that Kagan wrote to force the administration’s hand, to challenge its mettle for the fight – the exact same language and tone used to egg on skeptical fence-sitters in Congress during the Bush years and to embarrass Democrats in various political campaigns over the last eight years.

One asks, do military scholars from West Point normally engage in cheerleading exercises such as the "Gathering of the Eagles III" alongside pro-war provocateur Melanie "Move America Forward" Morgan? The movement, initially hyper-promoted by Michelle Malkin as a counterprotest to the March 2007 antiwar march on the Pentagon, has flourished across the right-wing universe. Attendees at the July 2007 event found themselves enriched by Kimberly Kagan’s military acumen and, of course, her positive reports from the frontlines of The Surge.

"She was able to explain what is happening in Iraq like I have never heard before," said one attendee and blogger. "She was able to break down all the dynamics involved so it was actually easy to understand what we are trying to accomplish, where we stand now and where we need to be. The one common denominator of all this? Our Sons’ and Daughters’ missions will be complete! We are on our way to victory in Iraq!"

Funny, most aspiring scholars in Washington try so hard to be interpreted as politically impartial that they most often come off as wishy-washy and milquetoast. Not so with the neoconservative set – particularly the Kagans, including Robert Kagan, Fred’s brother, who now runs the post-Project for a New American Century Foreign Policy Initiative (and pushes publicly for escalation in Afghanistan) with Weekly Standard editor Bill Kristol and former Bush administration flak Dan Senor. Fred and Bob’s father, historian Donald Kagan, is a former Yale professor and preeminent neoconservative writer who was given the National Humanities Medal by then-president Bush in 2003.

Thanks to their coveted connections to the levers of power, they enjoy the best of both worlds – holding forth among Washington military scholars and analysts in spite of their ambitious political agendas. And because the neoconservative foreign policy position continues to hold sway in the disjointed Republican Party, speakers like the Kagans are often wheeled out – however surreptitiously – to defend the party line, "the loyal opposition" as it were. "It is much harder for them to be marginalized," said Lobe.

Hardly marginalized, the Kagans have set about to bring the administration to heel on the issue of Afghanistan, and they are well placed in a co-dependent relationship forged with Petraeus, Odierno, and McChrystal back in Iraq. The Kagans are able to pursue their advocacy of the Long War, while the generals craftily use the media-savvy duo as cover to force Obama to wage the war their way.

Instead of questioning this gross politicization of national security, the Washington establishment and media enable it by perpetuating the myth that Kimberly and Fred Kagan are mere experts in their field, which allows them the perfect platform to bully Obama on behalf of an empowered military authority.

There is little the establishment can do on its own: it is easily cowed by power and confidence and would rather reward the imperiousness of the neoconservatives than expose their double-branding. It is up to the media to at least call them what they are, not scholars or "analysts" but shills, marching the country into a quagmire, again.

### 2NC AT: N/U—Reintervene/Latch-on

#### AND, a robust and statistically significant study proves.

Bafumi & Parent 12—Professor of Government at Dartmouth College & Professor of Political Science at University of Miami [Joseph Bafumi & Joseph Parent “International polarity and America’s polarization,” International Politics (2012) 49, pg. 1–35]

We reach different predictions than rival views, and this makes falsifying our argument easier. American polarization will correlate with relative power, and the principal actors promoting or retarding polarization are potential peer competitors. There are several prime candidates: China, a unified Europe, and, more remotely, India and Russia. As any or all of these contenders approach America’s level of power, we predict that polarization should begin to level off and fall. Our optimism on polarization’s decline is based on the questionable but widely held assumption that China will rise to peer competitor status in the foreseeable future (Economist, 2007, p. 12). Although non-state threats (for example, terrorism, disease, environmental degradation, economic depression) may yet reveal themselves to be as influential as great power politics, our evidence suggests that traditional measures of power offer firm purchase for the present.

Conclusion: Unipolarized America - The central point of this article is that American polarization may have as much to do with what is going on outside the country as inside it. Scarcities of power thrust parties together, surpluses of power pushes parties apart. Across the best available data and various operationalizations, our findings are significant and robust. Certainly there are other factors at work, but the explanatory prowess of relative power deserves greater attention. We agree that the connection between security and unity is an introductory international relations insight, but it is apparently not prevalent in American politics because no previous argument has centered on it or attempted to measure it. Other major findings concern the international origins of domestic inequality and the insignificance of inequality as a provenance of polarization.

Today’s discussion on American inequality assumes it is the product of technology, social capital, the returns of hard work, education, and so on. We do not disagree these are contributors, yet we find these arguments incomplete and suggest that economic views be braced by political perspectives. Our evidence suggests that income inequality is partially the product of enemy states’ relative power, and that inequality is not the chief cause of polarization. A crucial upshot of our argument is that the United States faces a dilemma between conflict abroad and conflict at home. Without large dragons to contend with overseas, Americans will find domestic foes to demonize instead. The result is trading between problems, and the readers shall judge which problems are preferable. But we predict that as China becomes a peer competitor polarization will gradually diminish, institutional stalemates will abate, and American foreign policy will regain its luster.

The Founders based American government on the belief that concentrations of power corrupt. Yet through their skill and good fortune, they created a state that has become the largest concentration of international power in centuries. As some Americans strive for strength beyond challenge, they should be aware of the probable consequences. US unipolarity is not only a recipe for imperious international conduct; it is also a recipe for nastier domestic faction. The first action tends to provoke balancing coalitions, the second paves the path for internecine strife, but both crop hegemonic power. Naturally, neither outcome is inevitable, and much depends on how Americans use their anomalously large autonomy while it lasts. Nonetheless, sooner or later unipolarity will end; the lot left to decision-makers is how to make a virtue of this necessity. Pg. 26-28

#### The only comprehensive study proves no transition impact.

MacDonald & Parent 11—Professor of Political Science at Williams College & Professor of Political Science at University of Miami [Paul K. MacDonald & Joseph M. Parent, “Graceful Decline? The Surprising Success of Great Power Retrenchment,” International Security, Vol. 35, No. 4 (Spring 2011), pp. 7–44]

In this article, we question the logic and evidence of the retrenchment pessimists. To date there has been neither a comprehensive study of great power retrenchment nor a study that lays out the case for retrenchment as a practical or probable policy. This article fills these gaps by systematically examining the relationship between acute relative decline and the responses of great powers. We examine eighteen cases of acute relative decline since 1870 and advance three main arguments.

First, we challenge the retrenchment pessimists’ claim that domestic or international constraints inhibit the ability of declining great powers to retrench. In fact, when states fall in the hierarchy of great powers, peaceful retrenchment is the most common response, even over short time spans. Based on the empirical record, we find that great powers retrenched in no less than eleven and no more than fifteen of the eighteen cases, a range of 61–83 percent. When international conditions demand it, states renounce risky ties, increase reliance on allies or adversaries, draw down their military obligations, and impose adjustments on domestic populations.

Second, we find that the magnitude of relative decline helps explain the extent of great power retrenchment. Following the dictates of neorealist theory, great powers retrench for the same reason they expand: the rigors of great power politics compel them to do so.12 Retrenchment is by no means easy, but necessity is the mother of invention, and declining great powers face powerful incentives to contract their interests in a prompt and proportionate manner. Knowing only a state’s rate of relative economic decline explains its corresponding degree of retrenchment in as much as 61 percent of the cases we examined.

Third, we argue that the rate of decline helps explain what forms great power retrenchment will take. How fast great powers fall contributes to whether these retrenching states will internally reform, seek new allies or rely more heavily on old ones, and make diplomatic overtures to enemies. Further, our analysis suggests that great powers facing acute decline are less likely to initiate or escalate militarized interstate disputes. Faced with diminishing resources, great powers moderate their foreign policy ambitions and offer concessions in areas of lesser strategic value. Contrary to the pessimistic conclusions of critics, retrenchment neither requires aggression nor invites predation. Great powers are able to rebalance their commitments through compromise, rather than conflict. In these ways, states respond to penury the same way they do to plenty: they seek to adopt policies that maximize security given available means. Far from being a hazardous policy, retrenchment can be successful. States that retrench often regain their position in the hierarchy of great powers. Of the fifteen great powers that adopted retrenchment in response to acute relative decline, 40 percent managed to recover their ordinal rank. In contrast, none of the declining powers that failed to retrench recovered their relative position. Pg. 9-10

#### US decline will not spark wars—theory and the empirical record prove.

MacDonald & Parent 11—Professor of Political Science at Williams College & Professor of Political Science at University of Miami [Paul K. MacDonald & Joseph M. Parent, “Graceful Decline? The Surprising Success of Great Power Retrenchment,” International Security, Vol. 35, No. 4 (Spring 2011), pp. 7–44]

Our findings are directly relevant to what appears to be an impending great power transition between China and the United States. Estimates of economic performance vary, but most observers expect Chinese GDP to surpass U.S. GDP sometime in the next decade or two. 91 This prospect has generated considerable concern. Many scholars foresee major conflict during a Sino-U.S. ordinal transition. Echoing Gilpin and Copeland, John Mearsheimer sees the crux of the issue as irreconcilable goals: China wants to be America’s superior and the United States wants no peer competitors. In his words, “[N]o amount of goodwill can ameliorate the intense security competition that sets in when an aspiring hegemon appears in Eurasia.” 92

Contrary to these predictions, our analysis suggests some grounds for optimism. Based on the historical track record of great powers facing acute relative decline, the United States should be able to retrench in the coming decades. In the next few years, the United States is ripe to overhaul its military, shift burdens to its allies, and work to decrease costly international commitments. It is likely to initiate and become embroiled in fewer militarized disputes than the average great power and to settle these disputes more amicably. Some might view this prospect with apprehension, fearing the steady erosion of U.S. credibility. Yet our analysis suggests that retrenchment need not signal weakness. Holding on to exposed and expensive commitments simply for the sake of one’s reputation is a greater geopolitical gamble than withdrawing to cheaper, more defensible frontiers.

Some observers might dispute our conclusions, arguing that hegemonic transitions are more conflict prone than other moments of acute relative decline. We counter that there are deductive and empirical reasons to doubt this argument. Theoretically, hegemonic powers should actually find it easier to manage acute relative decline. Fallen hegemons still have formidable capability, which threatens grave harm to any state that tries to cross them. Further, they are no longer the top target for balancing coalitions, and recovering hegemons may be influential because they can play a pivotal role in alliance formation. In addition, hegemonic powers, almost by definition, possess more extensive overseas commitments; they should be able to more readily identify and eliminate extraneous burdens without exposing vulnerabilities or exciting domestic populations.

We believe the empirical record supports these conclusions. In particular, periods of hegemonic transition do not appear more conflict prone than those of acute decline. The last reversal at the pinnacle of power was the AngloAmerican transition, which took place around 1872 and was resolved without armed confrontation. The tenor of that transition may have been influenced by a number of factors: both states were democratic maritime empires, the United States was slowly emerging from the Civil War, and Great Britain could likely coast on a large lead in domestic capital stock. Although China and the United States differ in regime type, similar factors may work to cushion the impending Sino-American transition. Both are large, relatively secure continental great powers, a fact that mitigates potential geopolitical competition. 93 China faces a variety of domestic political challenges, including strains among rival regions, which may complicate its ability to sustain its economic performance or engage in foreign policy adventurism. 94

Most important, the United States is not in free fall. Extrapolating the data into the future, we anticipate the United States will experience a “moderate” decline, losing from 2 to 4 percent of its share of great power GDP in the five years after being surpassed by China sometime in the next decade or two. 95 Given the relatively gradual rate of U.S. decline relative to China, the incentives for either side to run risks by courting conflict are minimal. The United States would still possess upwards of a third of the share of great power GDP, and would have little to gain from provoking a crisis over a peripheral issue. Conversely, China has few incentives to exploit U.S. weakness. 96 Given the importance of the U.S. market to the Chinese economy, in addition to the critical role played by the dollar as a global reserve currency, it is unclear how Beijing could hope to consolidate or expand its increasingly advantageous position through direct confrontation. In short, the United States should be able to reduce its foreign policy commitments in East Asia in the coming decades without inviting Chinese expansionism. Indeed, there is evidence that a policy of retrenchment could reap potential benefits. The drawdown and repositioning of U.S. troops in South Korea, for example, rather than fostering instability, has resulted in an improvement in the occasionally strained relationship between Washington and Seoul. 97 U.S. moderation on Taiwan, rather than encouraging hard-liners in Beijing, resulted in an improvement in cross-strait relations and reassured U.S. allies that Washington would not inadvertently drag them into a Sino-U.S. conflict. 98 Moreover, Washington’s support for the development of multilateral security institutions, rather than harming bilateral alliances, could work to enhance U.S. prestige while embedding China within a more transparent regional order. 99 A policy of gradual retrenchment need not undermine the credibility of U.S. alliance commitments or unleash destabilizing regional security dilemmas. Indeed, even if Beijing harbored revisionist intent, it is unclear that China will have the force projection capabilities necessary to take and hold additional territory. 100 By incrementally shifting burdens to regional allies and multilateral institutions, the United States can strengthen the credibility of its core commitments while accommodating the interests of a rising China. Not least among the benefits of retrenchment is that it helps alleviate an unsustainable financial position. Immense forward deployments will only exacerbate U.S. grand strategic problems and risk unnecessary clashes. 101

### 2NC Jervis—No GP war

#### AND, great power bargaining prevents war.

Chadefaux 11—Professor of Political Science at ETH Zurich [Dr. Thomas Chadefaux, “Bargaining over power: when do shifts in power lead to war? International Theory (2011), 3:2, pg. 228–253]

This result shows that the commitment problem caused by large and rapid shifts in relative power, as identified by Powell (2004), can be avoided when transfers of capabilities are added as a dimension in the bargaining space. By giving up capabilities now, B changes his expected maximization problem in the next period, and hence credibly commits to the agreement in the next period. The result holds no matter how large or rapid the power shift is. As a result, shifts in relative power alone cannot be a sufficient explanation for war.

Negotiating over power in practice - Although the previous section showed that states can often avoid commitment problems by negotiating over their relative power, have states historically really engaged in such negotiations? This section presents evidence that they have.

Avoiding shifts in power - Powell (2006) demonstrates convincingly that offense and first-mover advantages are special cases of commitment problems caused by rapid changes in power.9 By striking first, a state can significantly increase its chance of prevailing, and hence this is a situation in which rapid changes in power—or at least the anticipation thereof—lead to war. If concerns about a preemptive attack are what prevents efficient bargaining, however, the players should be willing to alleviate the other's fears by voluntarily limiting their ability to launch such an attack. For example, the parties can remove their troops from the border, or create demilitarized zones.10 On 30 July 1914, for example, the French Prime Minister René Viviani ordered a 10-km troop withdrawal along the entire French–German border.11

They can also ease commitment problems through agreements that limit the stocks or range of offensive weapons (e.g. the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union), as well as by the removal of threatening weapons. Thus, the Cuban missile crisis is a case in which the bargaining power of the Soviet Union would have dramatically increased as soon as the missiles would have become operational. Direct conflict was avoided by negotiations over missiles—that is, explicitly over instruments of power. Similarly, Gorbatchev's 1988 unilateral troop reduction of 500,000 men in Eastern Europe had the consequence of making a surprise attack almost impossible (Kydd 2005).12

Negotiations over power extend beyond immediate threats, however. Limitations on naval armaments, for example, address concerns about shifts in power over longer periods than the simple withdrawal of troops or offensive weapons mentioned above. A fleet takes time and is costly to build, and personnel need intensive training that cannot be improvised over a short period of time.13 With such agreements, states avoid deeper shifts in power by limiting growth in naval armaments. In the 18th century, for example, Choiseul—then France's minister for foreign affairs—chose to limit the reconstruction of the French Navy in order to avoid fear, and a possible preventive reaction from Britain. France did not seek superiority, or even parity, but rather purposefully maintained a fleet equal to two-thirds of the British one (Masson 1981).14

The Washington Naval Treaty of 1922 is a more recent example of states bargaining over power to ease tensions created by differentials in relative growth. After World War I, the British Empire had the world's largest and most powerful navy, although the United States, and to a lesser extent, Japan were following closely. More concerning for Britain, the United States had announced its goal to create a navy ‘second to none’, whereas Japan was actively increasing the size of its fleet. Furthermore, the United States’ economic power surpassed that of the United Kingdom, and it would therefore not be long until the Royal Navy would fall behind. Contrary to common beliefs, naval rivalry led to strong tensions between the two countries. Buell (1922), a contemporary of the conference, writes for example:

The naval program of the United States, along with its refusal to join the League of Nations, naturally aroused the suspicion of England as to the impurity of American motives. It is certain that eventually the British Empire would have answered the challenge of the ‘big navy’ men in the United States. […]. But such a struggle could be forestalled only by checking naval competition. (p. 147)

In hindsight, it is tempting to underplay the rivalry of two countries that ended up not going to war. Yet, strong tensions were palpable not only with Japan but also with Britain—so much so that some even stated that ‘the relations between the two countries are beginning to assume the same character as that between England and Germany before the war’.15

It is in this context that the United States called for a disarmament conference. The treaty reached in Washington in 1922 limits the naval armaments of its five signatories—the United States, Britain, Japan, France, and Italy. It was widely viewed as an attempt to ease the climate of tensions by limiting the arms race, and particularly the fast-growing Navy of the United States.16 Doing this even involved the destruction of 15 existing ships and 11 uncompleted ones. In the words of Secretary of State Stimson,

The United States […] was engaged in building a fleet of battleships larger and more powerful than those of any other nation in the world. […]. In order to stop naval competition and to put an end to the consequent rivalry, suspicion, and fear between the nations which would grow out of such competition, America destroyed all of those new ships, together with thirteen older battleships in her possession.17

Still, one could object that preemptive wars almost never happen (Reiter 1995), and hence that this whole argument is largely irrelevant. However, the fact that this type of wars happens only rarely could actually be in support of the argument that states do negotiate over their relative power, precisely to avoid ‘powder keg’ situations. In other words, it is because states negotiate over their relative power that potentially dangerous situations in which a state might be tempted to preempt never emerge in the first place. Pg. 234-237

### 2NC I/L—Prolif

#### Unipolarity encourages small state prolif—only US restraint solves.

Monteiro 11—Professor of Political Science at Yale University [Nuno P. Monteiro, “Unrest Assured: Why Unipolarity Is Not Peaceful,” International Security, Vol. 36, No. 3 (Winter 2011/12), pp. 9–40]

After correcting for these two limitations, it becomes clear that unipolarity possesses much potential for conflict. Contrary to what Wohlforth argued, unipolarity is not a system in which the unipole is spared from any conflicts and major powers become involved only in peripheral wars. Instead, a unipolar system is one that provides incentives for recurrent wars between the sole great power and recalcitrant minor powers, as well as occasional wars among major and minor powers. That is the central prediction of my theory. To be sure, the unique historical character of the current unipolar era makes the task of building a general theory of unipolarity difficult. Particularly, it requires great care in distinguishing between those features of the post–Cold War world that are intrinsic to a unipolar system and those that stem from specific aspects of contemporary international politics. Two points deserve mention.

First, my theory of conflict in unipolarity is robust to changes in military technology. Still, some such changes would mean the end of unipolarity. At one end of the scale, some scholars argue that the widespread possession of equalizing technologies such as nuclear weapons would turn all minor powers into major powers and decrease the use of the unipole’s power-projection capabilities in ways that might invalidate the label of unipolarity.113 At the other end of the scale, should the unipole develop a splendid first-strike capability against all other states—an unlikely prospect, no doubt—its relative power would increase, perhaps replacing anarchy with hegemony.114 Both of these developments would mean that my theory no longer applies.

Second, my argument is robust to changes in the geographical configuration of the distribution of power. Were a future unipolar era to feature a continental, rather than an offshore, unipole, the paths to conflict described above would still apply. A continental unipole’s inability to disengage from its neighbors might increase the proportion of conflict in which it will be involved at the expense of conflicts between others, but the conflict-producing mechanisms would remain the same.115

From the perspective of the overall peacefulness of the international system, then, no U.S. grand strategy is, as in the Goldilocks tale, “just right.”116 In fact, each strategic option available to the unipole produces significant conflict. Whereas offensive and defensive dominance will entangle it in wars against recalcitrant minor powers, disengagement will produce regional wars among minor and major powers. Regardless of U.S. strategy, conflict will abound. Indeed, if my argument is correct, the significant level of conflict the world has experienced over the last two decades will continue for as long as U.S. power remains preponderant.

From the narrower perspective of the unipole’s ability to avoid being involved in wars, however, disengagement is the best strategy. A unipolar structure provides no incentives for conflict involving a disengaged unipole. Disengagement would extricate the unipole’s forces from wars against recalcitrant minor powers and decrease systemic pressures for nuclear proliferation. There is, however, a downside. Disengagement would lead to heightened conflict beyond the unipole’s region and increase regional pressures for nuclear proliferation. As regards the unipole’s grand strategy, then, the choice is between a strategy of dominance, which leads to involvement in numerous conflicts, and a strategy of disengagement, which allows conflict between others to fester.

In a sense, then, strategies of defensive and offensive dominance are self-defeating. They create incentives for recalcitrant minor powers to bolster their capabilities and present the United States with a tough choice: allowing them to succeed or resorting to war in order to thwart them. This will either drag U.S. forces into numerous conflicts or result in an increasing number of major powers. In any case, U.S. ability to convert power into favorable outcomes peacefully will be constrained.117

This last point highlights one of the crucial issues where Wohlforth and I differ—the benefits of the unipole’s power preponderance. Whereas Wohlforth believes that the power preponderance of the United States will lead all states in the system to bandwagon with the unipole, I predict that states engaged in security competition with the unipole’s allies and states for whom the status quo otherwise has lesser value will not accommodate the unipole. To the contrary, these minor powers will become recalcitrant despite U.S. power preponderance, displaying the limited pacifying effects of U.S. power.

What, then, is the value of unipolarity for the unipole? What can a unipole do that a great power in bipolarity or multipolarity cannot? My argument hints at the possibility that—at least in the security realm—unipolarity does not give the unipole greater influence over international outcomes.118 If unipolarity provides structural incentives for nuclear proliferation, it may, as Robert Jervis has hinted, “have within it the seeds if not of its own destruction, then at least of its modification.”119 For Jervis, “[t]his raises the question of what would remain of a unipolar system in a proliferated world. The American ability to coerce others would decrease but so would its need to defend friendly powers that would now have their own deterrents. The world would still be unipolar by most measures and considerations, but many countries would be able to protect themselves, perhaps even against the superpower. . . . In any event, the polarity of the system may become less important.”120 At the same time, nothing in my argument determines the decline of U.S. power. The level of conflict entailed by the strategies of defensive dominance, offensive dominance, and disengagement may be acceptable to the unipole and have only a marginal effect on its ability to maintain its preeminent position. Whether a unipole will be economically or militarily overstretched is an empirical question that depends on the magnitude of the disparity in power between it and major powers and the magnitude of the conflicts in which it gets involved. Neither of these factors can be addressed a priori, and so a theory of unipolarity must acknowledge the possibility of frequent conflict in a nonetheless durable unipolar system.

Finally, my argument points to a “paradox of power preponderance.”121 By putting other states in extreme self-help, a systemic imbalance of power requires the unipole to act in ways that minimize the threat it poses. Only by exercising great restraint can it avoid being involved in wars. If the unipole fails to exercise restraint, other states will develop their capabilities, including nuclear weapons—restraining it all the same.122 Paradoxically, then, more relative power does not necessarily lead to greater influence and a better ability to convert capabilities into favorable outcomes peacefully. In effect, unparalleled relative power requires unequaled self-restraint. Pg. 37-40

### 2NC Impact UQ—Prolif Breakout

#### 20 countries could quickly breakout.

Rotfeld 11—Former Director of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute [Adam Rotfeld, Where is the World Heading? Shaping a New International System,” International Community Law Review 13 (2011) 5–22]

The new international political and military environment differs fundamentally from the situation that was the cause and source of the Cold War. The new reality is incomparably more complex and attempts to steer or ‘manage’ the world in keeping with a political philosophy of rival power centres (‘multipolarism’). In military terms, the United States and Russia (as the successor-state to the Soviet Union) have long since lost their nuclear monopoly. Furthermore, a serious erosion of the nuclear non-proliferation regime has taken place, and nuclear weapons are now in the hands not only of the five great powers—members of the UN Security Council—but also in possession of India, Pakistan, and Israel which is universally considered a ‘nuclear state’, though it has never declared itself as such and has not yet conducted any nuclear tests.

A significant destabilizing factor comes from the states that are contesting the established international political and legal order (namely, North Korea and Iran) and which, their official declarations and obligations notwithstanding, have made attempts, with varying degrees of success, to set in motion their own nuclear programs. The construction of nuclear weapons program in Iran and North Korea is carried out under the pretext of building nuclear reactors for peaceful purposes. Nearly 20 other states are sufficiently advanced technologically to allow them to produce their own nuclear weapons in a relatively short time. Pg. 10

### 2NC Overview—Tech

#### AND, our impact is 100 million times greater than nuclear war—You should vote neg even if 99% of humanity will perish.

Ćirković 8—Professor of Physics @ University of Novi Sad in Serbia and Senior Research Associate at the Astronomical Observatory of Belgrade [Milan M. Ćirković Ph.D. (Fellow of the Institute for Ethics and Emerging Technologies), “How can we reduce the risk of human extinction?,” Institute for Ethics and Emerging Technologies, September 17, 2008, pg. http://ieet.org/index.php/IEET/print/2606]

The risks from anthropogenic hazards appear at present larger than those from natural ones. Although great progress has been made in reducing the number of nuclear weapons in the world, humanity is still threatened by the possibility of a global thermonuclear war and a resulting nuclear winter. We may face even greater risks from emerging technologies. Advances in synthetic biology might make it possible to engineer pathogens capable of extinction-level pandemics. The knowledge, equipment, and materials needed to engineer pathogens are more accessible than those needed to build nuclear weapons. And unlike other weapons, pathogens are self-replicating, allowing a small arsenal to become exponentially destructive. Pathogens have been implicated in the extinctions of many wild species. Although most pandemics “fade out” by reducing the density of susceptible populations, pathogens with wide host ranges in multiple species can reach even isolated individuals. The intentional or unintentional release of engineered pathogens with high transmissibility, latency, and lethality might be capable of causing human extinction. While such an event seems unlikely today, the likelihood may increase as biotechnologies continue to improve at a rate rivaling Moore’s Law.

Farther out in time are technologies that remain theoretical but might be developed this century. Molecular nanotechnology could allow the creation of self-replicating machines capable of destroying the ecosystem. And advances in neuroscience and computation might enable improvements in cognition that accelerate the invention of new weapons. A survey at the Oxford conference found that concerns about human extinction were dominated by fears that new technologies would be misused. These emerging threats are especially challenging as they could become dangerous more quickly than past technologies, outpacing society’s ability to control them. As H.G. Wells noted, “Human history becomes more and more a race between education and catastrophe.”

Such remote risks may seem academic in a world plagued by immediate problems, such as global poverty, HIV, and climate change. But as intimidating as these problems are, they do not threaten human existence. In discussing the risk of nuclear winter, Carl Sagan emphasized the astronomical toll of human extinction:

A nuclear war imperils all of our descendants, for as long as there will be humans. Even if the population remains static, with an average lifetime of the order of 100 years, over a typical time period for the biological evolution of a successful species (roughly ten million years), we are talking about some 500 trillion people yet to come. By this criterion, the stakes are one million times greater for extinction than for the more modest nuclear wars that kill “only” hundreds of millions of people. There are many other possible measures of the potential loss—including culture and science, the evolutionary history of the planet, and the significance of the lives of all of our ancestors who contributed to the future of their descendants. Extinction is the undoing of the human enterprise.

There is a discontinuity between risks that threaten 10 percent or even 99 percent of humanity and those that threaten 100 percent. For disasters killing less than all humanity, there is a good chance that the species could recover. If we value future human generations, then reducing extinction risks should dominate our considerations. Fortunately, most measures to reduce these risks also improve global security against a range of lesser catastrophes, and thus deserve support regardless of how much one worries about extinction.

#### AND, nuclear winter doesn’t exist—Robock is cooking the numbers

Seitz 11—Research fellow in physics @ Harvard University [Russell Seitz (Ph. D in applied physics @ Harvard University), “Nuclear winter was and is debatable,” Nature, 475, 37 (07 July 2011) pg. http://tinyurl.com/7jr3sxz]

Alan Robock's contention that there has been no real scientific debate about the 'nuclear winter' concept is itself debatable (Nature 473, 275–276; 2011). This potential climate disaster, popularized in Science in 1983, rested on the output of a one-dimensional model that was later shown to overestimate the smoke a nuclear holocaust might engender. More refined estimates, combined with advanced three-dimensional models (see http://go.nature.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/kss8te), have dramatically reduced the extent and severity of the projected cooling.

Despite this, Carl Sagan, who co-authored the 1983 Science paper, went so far as to posit “the extinction of Homo sapiens” (C. Sagan Foreign Affairs 63, 75–77; 1984). Some regarded this apocalyptic prediction as an exercise in mythology. George Rathjens of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology protested: “Nuclear winter is the worst example of the misrepresentation of science to the public in my memory,” (see http://go.nature.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/yujz84) and climatologist Kerry Emanuel observed that the subject had “become notorious for its lack of scientific integrity” (Nature 319, 259; 1986).

Robock's single-digit fall in temperature is at odds with the subzero (about −25 °C) continental cooling originally projected for a wide spectrum of nuclear wars. Whereas Sagan predicted darkness at noon from a US–Soviet nuclear conflict, Robock projects global sunlight that is several orders of magnitude brighter for a Pakistan–India conflict — literally the difference between night and day. Since 1983, the projected worst-case cooling has fallen from a Siberian deep freeze spanning 11,000 degree-days Celsius (a measure of the severity of winters) to numbers so unseasonably small as to call the very term 'nuclear winter' into question.

### AT: Obama Solves

#### Obama won’t solve—multilateral binding is key.

Lake 10—Professor of Social and Political Science @ University of California, San Diego [David A. Lake (Founding chair of the International Political Economy Society and President of the International Studies Association) “Making America Safe for the World: Multilateralism and the Rehabilitation of US Authority,” Global Governance 16 (2010), 471–484

Unipolarity and the excesses of the GeorgeW. Bush administration that it permitted have finally brought the authority of the United States into public discourse—and into question. The “American empire” discussed in the mainstream media for the first time since at least the Vietnam War is an exaggeration, but the new use of the term reveals the increasingly problematic status of US rule.7 The Barack Obama administration is moving quickly to reverse the assertive unilateralism of its predecessor, a change in strategy that, it appears, played a major role in winning the new and untested president the Nobel Peace Prize.8 This new strategy will help reinforce the crumbling foundations of US authority. Yet the problem is deeper, more structural, and cannot be solved simply by a change of diplomatic tone or adopting more collaborative policies. To secure the international order that has been so beneficial in the past century and to succeed in extending that order to countries that do not yet enjoy its fruits require a new, more restraining, multilateral solution that binds the hands of the United States far more tightly than in the past. To rule legitimately requires tying the suzerain’s hands. Pg. 472 \*Suzerain—A nation that controls another nation in international affairs but allows it domestic sovereignty.

#### Obama will not make multilateralism a priority.

Peterson 10—Professor of International Politics @ University of Edinburgh [John Peterson “Multilateralism and the EU: A ‘Cheap Date’?,” The International Spectator, Vol. 45, No. 4, December 2010, pg. 43–48]

President Barack Obama’s administration in the US is far too distracted to make building multilateralism a priority. In foreign policy terms, Obama is a very reluctant ‘war president’. Nevertheless, he is the first in 40 years to inherit a shooting war on his first day in office. Obama is clearly determined not to have his presidency defined by the war in Afghanistan (although it might well be in the end). But he clearly has a troubled relationship with the US military. The difficulty of his transition from being the anti-war candidate to being commander-in-chief in what are effectively two wars—Afghanistan and Iraq (which is by no means over)—almost cannot be overestimated. Obama has made almost no more progress than his predecessor in multilateralising either conflict. Responsibility for this result is shared: it is due equally to the failure of European leaders to explain to their citizenries why contributions of troops—especially to Afghanistan—are justified, and to the failure of the US administration to allow European governments a voice in multilateral strategy to deal with either conflict. Pg. 45

### AT: Unipolarity is benign

#### Hubris will force the US to embrace tyrannical unipolarism—their ev on benevolence is purely theoretical.

Kanjilal 10—Professor of Poli Sci @ Calcutta University [Dr. Tanmay Kanjilal, “The American Mindset in the New World Order: The Perils of Hegemonic Ambitions Threaten the Virtues of World Leadership,” World Affairs, Spring 2010, Volume 14 No 1

In the new situation, the US could have played the leadership role that the rest of the world expected of it. It was not only in a position to assume such a role, but its leadership could have been qualified with universal acknowledgement and endorsement as well. Had the US been true and unprejudiced to this purpose, no one would have seen it as American perfidy. Eventually the US could have made the world see the necessity of its leadership in the interests of global fraternity, peace and well-being. While the situation called for US leadership and needed its tutelage, its mandarins thought only to indulge in establishing American hegemony by bullying nations and brandishing its overwhelming strategic power—all to express its machismo to bring the world within its grip. One wonders at America’s wisdom in distinguishing between the virtues of being the benevolent world leader and the perils of being a hegemonic power. Those who have closely watched its mindset and follow up actions—particularly after the fall of the Soviet Union (the leaning stick of many nations during the Cold War period)—wonder why the country fails to rise to the occasion, for converting the unipolar world order into a cooperative world order. The bipolar world experienced a divided dominance of global politics, but with the disappearance of that order, the US has developed a penchant for undivided dominance that it never had earlier.

Theoretically, unipolarism may be benevolent or tyrannical, depending on the attitude of the unipolar power. Benevolent unipolarism would lead to a cooperative world order based on the principles of sovereignty of nations and the rule of law. Tyrannical unipolarism would only aim to a hegemonic world order, increasing the Americanophobia of other nations. Normative reasoning is one thing, realpolitik based on realities and material affairs, another. It is the reality that nations motivated by self-interests, seek greater power, turning international politics into a struggle— leave alone the debate if it should be so or otherwise.

What will the future be like? Within the US, a particular psychology may burgeon and work in it, consciously or subconsciously. This particular psychological state of mind would reflect in actions in the form of domineering attitudes, egoism, [and] unilateralism and at its height, in the form of considering as law unto itself. In the process, coercive measures are used and the most unacceptable face of American hegemony exposed. Distorted tastes seem easier to follow than noble ones. Dictated by arrogance and an audacious mindset, which seem to be the natural attributes of unipolarism in global politics, the US would want a world of its liking, instead of it being after the liking of the world. Taking pride in its predominant power position and notion of invincibility, it would predictably prefer to be the Machiavellian Prince (with the notion that it is safer and better to be more feared than loved) to the Platonic Philosopher King of the world. It would long to be the Austinian sovereign with power of the Hobbesian Leviathan rather than be a Benthamite state with reduced authority or a Laskian internationalist.

Unilateralism—militant adventurism, an overestimation of strength, power projection, unifocal attention, etc—is the common characteristic of hegemonic powers. The US’s approach to global issues—varying in degree and stress but not in kind, displays these features. In its perception and thinking an international decision was what the US said it was, the views and judgments of other nations being marginalised. Other nations had to go its way or else invited American ire, sanctions or wrath—reducing all talks of independence and the sovereign equality of nations to a farce. Unlike a world leader, but rather like a hegemonic ruler, the US defied the United Nations (UN) and clung to its ego and position—its aggression on Iraq in 2003 being a glaring example. Such defiance found favour with unilateralists. One analyst noted that the role of the UN “in determining the circumstances legitimising force”, expanded during the Clinton administration under pressure from America’s European allies. Almost in a tone of aversion to such an expanded UN role, he added that this “may have created significant obstacles for future administrations confronted by the need to employ force and in doing so, to act alone” (Robert W Tucker, “Alone or with Others: The Temptations of PostCold War Power”, Foreign Affairs, Vol 78, No 6, November–December 1999, pp 15–20). Pg. 31-33